Sidney Hook’s Pragmatic Anti-Communism: Commitment to Democracy as Method by Ferriter, Courtney
Education and Culture 33 (1) (2017): 89-105   89
Article
Sidney Hook’s Pragmatic 




In recent years, opposition to Communism has emerged as Sidney Hook’s central 
philosophical legacy in the eyes of scholars and historians, who tend to ignore all 
of Hook’s pre-Cold War philosophical contributions. Furthermore, critics who 
treat Hook’s anti-Communism often accuse him of abandoning pragmatism for 
dogmatism in his later career. In this essay, I argue that Hook’s long-standing fight 
against Communism should be understood as an unwavering application of the 
democratic method in line with his mentor John Dewey’s understanding of prag-
matism as well as the commitment to scientific empiricism espoused by earlier 
pragmatists C. S. Peirce and William James.
Sidney Hook’s intellectual legacy is steeped in controversy. Matthew Bagger calls 
Hook “an unjustly neglected figure [whose] relative obscurity owes [in part] to his 
renown as a cold warrior, which repelled the generation of scholars that came of 
age in the late nineteen sixties and seventies.”1 Indeed, for many scholars, a first 
point of reference for Sidney Hook is not pragmatism, nor even Hook’s teacher and 
mentor John Dewey, but Hook’s staunch commitment to anti-Communism. In 
2004, Richard Rorty wrote of him that “at the present time (if perhaps not forever) 
our major interest in Hook will be in his crusade against the influence of Stalin-
ism on US intellectual and political life,”2 an assertion that has yet to be disproven 
in the years since. With few exceptions, critical scholarship surrounding Hook 
since the 1980s has tended to focus primarily on his anti-Communism, from the 
Committee for Cultural Freedom to the Waldorf Conference to Hook’s denounce-
ment and suggested suspension of academics who were Communist Party mem-
bers. Perhaps even worse, Hook has been lambasted for being so swept up in his 
anti-Communist agenda that his stance becomes distinctly non-pragmatic. On 
this point, Robert Talisse writes that philosophers who consider Hook at all often 
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read him as “abandoning Deweyan pragmatism for some awkward combination 
of analytic philosophy and conservative politics”3 in his later career. In popular 
culture, Hook has become a celebrated figure for the American Right,4 who laud 
him for his unyielding anti-Communist stances before and during the Cold War, 
as well as his later opposition to affirmative action and the adoption of multicul-
tural curricula by colleges and universities. Hook received the Presidential Medal 
of Freedom from President Ronald Reagan in 1985, and the National Association 
of Scholars has presented its Sidney Hook Memorial Award to notable right-wing 
figures including Thomas Sowell and Gertrude Himmelfarb.
Considering the controversy Hook has generated among scholars and academ-
ics, as well as the way in which he has been generally overlooked or dismissed by left-
ist philosophers and intellectuals who condemn his hard line Cold War stances, it is 
vital for his intellectual legacy (as well as pragmatism’s wider reputation) to examine 
his anti-Communist views closely and to determine their relationship to his Dew-
eyan pragmatism. My reading of Hook indicates that he should be viewed as less of a 
Cold War villain and more as a victim of misreading. Richard J. Bernstein has written 
that a common way of thinking about Freud’s writings on religion5 “does the great-
est violence to what he is trying to show us,”6 and I contend that a parallel situation 
has occurred with Hook’s staunch anti-Communist stances before and during the 
Cold War. I will argue that Sidney Hook’s long-standing fight against Communism 
does not constitute a deviation from or betrayal of pragmatism, as some scholars 
have concluded. Rather, Hook’s unwavering commitment to democracy as method 
is in line with both his mentor John Dewey’s understanding of pragmatism as well as 
the commitment to scientific empiricism espoused by earlier pragmatist figures like 
Charles S. Peirce and William James. In spite of pragmatism’s decline in popularity 
around mid-century,7 Hook nevertheless succeeded in championing an engaged and 
politically active philosophy centered on the application of the democratic method. 
Between his contributions to Cold War anti-Communist politics and his 
endorsements by conservative scholars and intellectuals as a man who represented 
traditional American values, it comes as little surprise that there is no love lost between 
Hook and politically left-leaning scholars or academics. Ruth R. Wisse has observed 
that in several volumes published on the New York Intellectuals (NYI)8 in the mid-
1980s, Hook “emerges [as] a favorite antagonist.”9 Alan Wald, for example, accuses 
Hook of not only betraying the socialist, revolutionary views of his youth, but of refus-
ing to admit it. On this point, he writes, “Hook would never acknowledge that the 
change in his views could be explained by social pressures brought on him and . . . a 
loss of ability to view the world from the class perspective of the oppressed.”10 Russell 
Jacoby is more straightforward about why scholars have not been particularly kind to 
Hook, arguing that leftists “feel little affection for a philosopher who worked nights 
to establish the grounds to exclude subversives, communists, and student radi-
cals from universities. Hook’s publications relentlessly raise the alarm that leftists, 
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communists, radicals, and what he calls ‘ritualist liberals’ endanger freedom.”11 Tity de 
Vries points out that many biographers of the NYI accuse the group, Hook included, 
of “sell[ing] out their critical and non-conformist position,”12 explaining that the NYI 
are primarily studied by “liberal and left historians, who either [deny] an increasing 
conservatism among the NYI or who [attack] them for becoming conservatives in 
the 1950s and 1960s.”13 While the NYI typically have socialist roots, scholars have 
noted a general trend toward neoconservatism in them. (Hook denied this accusa-
tion, insisting that he remained a democratic socialist and criticizing neoconservative 
figures like Hilton Kramer.) Taken together, these portraits suggest a fairly strong 
bias against both Hook and the NYI by academics, scholars, and historians who 
view them as having forsaken their socialist, Marxist roots in favor of what Nathan 
Abrams has called an “alliance with the anticommunist hegemony.”14
Arguably worse than Hook’s habitual casting as the villain of narratives 
surrounding the NYI, he has also been accused of being unpragmatic in his anti-
Communist views. Cornel West writes that Hook’s attachment to “tendentious 
cold war ideology”15 clouded and overshadowed his commitment to Deweyan 
pragmatism. Similarly, Robert Westbrook argues in a review of Hook’s memoir 
Out of Step that after his break with Communism in the mid-thirties, Hook main-
tained “an inflexibly essentialist conception of communism, [. . . which resulted in] 
a curiously unpragmatic way of looking at the world.”16 In his critique of Hook’s 
Cold War politics, John Capps specifically points to Hook’s argument in favor of 
a policy that excluded members of the Communist Party from university teaching 
positions. Capps argues that far from being pragmatist, “Hook’s position is much 
closer to the sort of logical argument characteristic of early analytic philosophy”17 
and that such a position is “at odds with other elements of his philosophical iden-
tity as a pragmatist.”18 In particular, Capps takes issue with Hook’s lack of consid-
eration for individual cases and circumstances in his haste to declare that being a 
card-carrying Communist “constituted prima facie grounds for dismissal.”19 Similar 
to Capps, Edward Shapiro observes in Hook a “tendency to substitute dogmatism 
for empirical evidence [in] the 1950s, when Hook maintained on a priori grounds 
that Communists should not be allowed to teach”20 in universities. Both Capps and 
Shapiro conclude that Hook’s lack of attention to context is distinctly unpragmatic.
Despite the criticism and controversy that surround his political and philo-
sophical positions, Hook retains a small contingent of support, mostly from scholars 
who examine the relationship between his pragmatist philosophy and his anti- 
Communist views. These scholars acknowledge that while Hook’s philosophical 
stances became more polemic and perhaps even dogmatic by the end of his life, his 
initial disdain for Communism and his strong anti-Communist stances during the 
Cold War are rooted in and connected to his Deweyan pragmatism. Matthew Cotter 
points to “the dangers associated with discussing Hook’s significance exclusively in 
terms of his anti-Communism,”21 as this is insufficient “for an evaluation of his life’s 
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work in its full complexity.”22 Rather, Cotter highlights Hook’s “unflagging commit-
ment to democracy as a way of life in the face of totalitarianism”23 as a major defining 
quality of his thought. Avital Bloch explains that Hook “combined pragmatism, as a 
philosophical method, with anti-totalitarianism. He considered anti-totalitarianism 
a political belief that is the imperative conclusion of a pragmatist examination of 
politics.”24 Considering Hook’s recommendation of suspending or firing Commu-
nist Party members among university faculty, Gary Bullert argues that Hook “was 
arguably applying the longstanding policy advocated by Dewey himself.”25 Similarly, 
Robert Talisse contends that “there is nothing unpragmatic or anti-contextualist 
about [Hook’s stance]. To the contrary, when taken in the context of the Cold War 
and the threat the CP [Communist Party] was then reasonably believed to pose, it 
seems a fully pragmatic response.”26 More recently, Laurence Jurdem has suggested 
that “his argument in favor of firing these academics returned Hook to his lessons 
in pragmatism, learned at the feet of John Dewey so many decades before, a prag-
matism that stood as the key reason he had turned against Communism and the 
Soviet Union in the first place.”27 Considered alongside one another, these critical 
examinations of Hook’s philosophy converge around the point that Hook’s anti-
Communist views are more nuanced and more closely tied to his understanding of 
Dewey and pragmatism than other scholars have given him credit for. 
My own argument adds to and extends the critical conversation surrounding 
the relationship between Hook’s pragmatism and anti-Communism by suggesting 
that Hook’s anti-Communist views are most accurately understood as an unwavering 
application of the democratic method. Furthermore, I connect Hook’s commitment 
to democracy as method with both Dewey’s understanding of democracy and the 
commitment to empiricism and scientific method espoused by Dewey’s and Hook’s 
classical pragmatist forerunners Charles S. Peirce and William James. In tracing a 
line of pragmatist figures who were all unyielding in their application of a method, 
I hope that scholars and historians of the Cold War, the New York Intellectuals, and 
twentieth-century pragmatism will see Hook in a new light and that future studies of 
Hook will add some much-needed nuance and complexity to his philosophical legacy.
Robert Talisse and Robert Tempio argue in the introduction to their edited 
collection of Sidney Hook’s essays that central to his political philosophy “is the 
radical conception of democracy that he inherited from John Dewey. It is with this 
conception that one must begin, and it is in the context of this conception that one 
must understand Hook’s other political commitments.”28 Dewey saw democracy 
as cooperative and experimental, and he viewed freedom of thought as essential to 
maintaining a democratic society. In “Democracy and Education Administration,” 
Dewey argues, “The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual 
to do as he pleases [. . . rather,] the basic freedom is that of freedom of mind and 
of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce 
freedom of intelligence.”29 He goes on to say that political democracy “must be 
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buttressed by the presence of democratic methods in all social relationships.”30 In 
other words, Dewey believed that open and informed inquiry was of utmost impor-
tance to democracy and that democratic methods should be applied in the social as 
well as the political realm. Similarly, he writes in Democracy and Education that an 
undesirable society “is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free 
intercourse and communication of experience.”31 Like Dewey, Hook viewed the 
abilities to freely collaborate, exchange ideas with others, and reach one’s own con-
clusions without being influenced by outside forces as cornerstones of democracy. 
Furthermore, Hook insisted on Dewey’s rule of applying the democratic method 
in social and political arenas alike to support free and open inquiry.  
Democracy, for Hook, entails a commitment to a procedure and a method 
rather than any specific theory or belief system about how the world works. Tal-
isse and Tempio argue that Hook opposed any movement that operated outside of 
democratic processes and any policy that could not be established using the demo-
cratic method.32 In fact, Hook believed that democracy had established itself as a 
superior social method. On this point, he argues,
Let us remember that when we are called upon to fight for democracy we 
are not asked to fight for an ideal which has just been proposed as a merely 
possible valid ideal for our times; we already have considerable evidence in 
its behalf, the weight of which, unfortunately too often, is properly evalu-
ated by some critics only when democracy is lost or imperiled. We have 
every reason to believe that we are fighting for a truth [. . .] in contradis-
tinction to others who fight for their truths, we are prepared to establish 
to reasonable men that democracy is the better alternative.33
In Hook’s philosophy, democracy must be applied as a method; that is, there can be 
no absolutes in our beliefs about democracy except the way in which we test those 
beliefs. If society wavers in its application of democracy as a rule of living, then it 
ceases to follow the method and can no longer call itself democratic. 
Hook’s commitment to method is evident from his earliest writings. In his 
dissertation The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, he argues that scientific rules or laws 
“can only be established by experiment and cannot be deduced from a priori notions 
or assumed to hold for one set of properties on the ground that they hold for any 
other.”34 Here Hook emphasizes the necessity of experimentation as a means of 
verifying scientific principles—using the scientific method to test results. He later 
asks how a proposition is determined to be false and offers by way of response that 
it is “not by a leap of intuition but by a test of its implications—and the implica-
tion to be recognizable must be of a type which is evidenced in some experienced 
context.”35 Thus, for Hook, testable, observable experience is critical to determining 
the truth or falsity of an idea, once again highlighting the importance of applying 
the scientific method to verify one’s results.
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Hook applies his thinking about the scientific method—the notion that sci-
ence is self-corrective—to his understanding of democracy. Because our society 
is ever changing and we are consistently faced with new situations or ideas, Hook 
advises that the most important question is “What method shall we follow in devel-
oping new beliefs and testing the old? For it is clear that no matter what belief we 
come to regard as valid, the evidence of its validity will depend in part, at least, 
upon the method which has been followed in reaching it.”36 Hook identifies three 
values central to a democratic way of life: first, a belief in the “intrinsic worth or 
dignity”37 of individuals; second, a belief in the value of diversity and variety; and 
finally, “a faith in some method by [which] conflicts are resolved.”38 On this last 
point, Hook elaborates, “Since the method must be the test of all values, it would 
not be inaccurate to call it the basic value in the democratic way of life. [. . .] In a 
democracy it must be directed to all issues, to all conflicts, if democracy is not to 
succumb to the dangers which threaten it from both within and without.”39 There-
fore, the democratic method, which Hook equates with free and open inquiry and 
application of the scientific method, is the cornerstone of any society that calls itself 
a democracy. Throughout his life, Hook maintained that the “democratic process 
is more important than any predetermined program,”40 and this ideal was particu-
larly evident in his dealings with Communism.
In his early years, Hook had similarly viewed Marx’s dialectical method as 
an empirical method of verification. Christopher Phelps argues that in Hook’s 1933 
volume Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, Hook recommends “an experi-
mental intellectual method, with knowledge considered hypothetical, fallible, and 
provisional, ideas held true only insofar as verifiable in experience or practice, 
and knowledge created and obtained, not solely received as sense-impression.”41 Like 
the scientific method, the dialectic method was experimental and its results were 
contingent upon verification in experience. Phelps concludes that for the young 
socialist Hook, “historical materialism was experimental naturalism,”42 and indeed, 
Hook himself writes in 1936 that “properly understood, dialectical materialism is a 
form of historical, experimental naturalism which stresses the role of human activity, 
under determinate conditions, in transforming the social world.”43 Yet just four years 
later in 1940, Hook wrote a letter to Albert Einstein in which his view of dialectical 
materialism had changed significantly. In this letter, Hook reveals, “I am at work on 
an extended critique of ‘dialectical materialism,’ the state philosophy of Soviet Rus-
sia, which seems to me every whit as false and pernicious as current ‘philosophical’ 
doctrines in Germany.”44 Hook’s reversal on dialectical materialism stems from the 
same source as his certainty that Communism was a threat to democracy.
In Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, Hook distinguishes his analysis of 
Marx from what he terms “orthodox Marxism,”45 which he understands as “an emas-
culation of Marx’s thought.”46 One specific fault Hook finds with orthodox Marxism 
is its insistence on seeking the unity of Marx’s thought through his conclusions rather 
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than his methods. On this point, he writes, “If Marx’s thought possesses unity, it 
is not to be found in his specific conclusions but in his method of analysis directed 
by the revolutionary purposes and needs of the international working class. The 
method, to be sure, is to be checked in the light of his conclusions; but the latter are 
derivative, not central. They are tentative and contingent.”47 He goes on to explain 
that it is therefore possible “to dissociate the Marxian method from any specific set of 
conclusions, or any particular political tactic advocated in its name. This is another 
way of saying that there is nothing a priori in Marx’s philosophy; it is naturalistic, 
historical and empirical throughout.”48 However, Hook criticizes so-called ortho-
dox Marxists for their misuse and abuse of dialectical materialism, claiming that 
“whereas Marx projected it as a method of understanding and making history, his 
disciples have tried to convert it into a system of sociology.”49 Hook believed that this 
misinterpretation of Marxism led to unchallenged dogmatism among Communists. 
In an article on Marxism published the same year as Towards the Understanding of 
Karl Marx, Hook argues that refusing to distinguish Marx’s analysis from the sub-
jective view of economic classes inherent to his (Marx’s) philosophy “has led to the 
mischievous myth that Marxism is an objective science which can demonstrate both 
the inevitability of communism and its inherent moral superiority.”50 
After dialectical materialism became the official doctrine of the U.S.S.R., Hook 
observed that rather than remaining flexible, resulting in tentative conclusions (as 
he believed it had in the writings of Marx and Engels), any flexibility inherent to 
the dialectical method was “sacrificed for unverifiable dogma.”51 Hook saw that 
discovering knowledge or truth was far less important to Communists than assert-
ing official state doctrine. In a 1940 review of Engels’s book Dialectics of Nature, 
Hook scathingly criticizes this sacrifice of knowledge on the altar of the Party’s 
authority. He writes, “Although it possesses no scientific importance whatsoever, 
Engels’s manuscript is none the less extremely valuable as a source book of the cur-
rent state philosophy of the U.S.S.R., dialectical materialism. Whenever the party 
line changes in science, the justifying quotations are taken from Engels, who did 
not even have the status of a gifted amateur in science.”52 Hook concludes that the 
book’s preface, written by J.B.S. Haldane, who claimed to have cured himself of 
stomach irritation by reading Lenin, “is a pitiful illustration of what happens to a 
fine intelligence when it gets political religion.” In his autobiography Out of Step, 
Hook recalls that after the Moscow Trials, Dewey admitted that “regardless of the 
accuracy of [Hook’s] interpretation of Marx, it was largely an intellectual conceit: 
To the extent that ideas counted in the world, Marxism in our time, he said, was the 
state philosophy of the Soviet Union and its satellites.”53 Hook felt similarly about 
the dialectical method. In a 1937 article entitled “Dialectic and Nature,” he concludes, 
“the dialectic method can claim to have meaning and validity only when it is under-
stood to be synonymous with scientific method [and] since in its traditional formu-
lation it is burdened with many misleading and mistaken conceptions, it would be 
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more conducive to clear thinking if the phrase were dropped.”54 In other words, in 
spite of whether Hook’s assessment of the Marxian dialectic as method in volumes 
like Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx was correct, dialectical materialism 
had been verified in experience to be the version espoused by orthodox Marxists 
and orthodox dialectical materialists. The dialectical method was no longer open to 
empiricism and experience; it was closed to all ideals except those of the CP. 
In addition, Hook’s experience with Communists cemented his belief that 
Communists were only concerned with advancing the goals of the Party. Com-
munism, as it was implemented by the Soviet Union, was irreconcilable with the 
communally agreed upon nature of inquiry and truth provided by the method 
of democracy because it was totalitarian. Avital Bloch explains that totalitarian 
regimes “violated individual liberties and free culture, whose protection was for 
Hook the primary condition for any political order calling itself a democracy.”55 A 
pragmatist like Hook is necessarily anti-totalitarian because pragmatism supports 
open inquiry and exchange of ideas. In fact, Peirce defines truth as “the opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,”56 linking scientific 
inquiry with the search for truth. Scientific truths are confirmed by a community 
of inquirers who arrive at the same conclusion, and in order for such a conclusion 
to be reached, people must be free to investigate ideas. For Hook, democracy oper-
ates under parallel principles: people must be free to apply the democratic method 
by ensuring that as many voices and opinions as possible are welcomed and con-
sidered. Totalitarianism is by its very nature opposed to such a goal, as it operates 
under the method of authority57 Peirce discusses in “The Fixation of Belief” wherein 
opinions are regulated by a governing body (in this case, the Communist Party) 
and any dissent from the knowledge or truths espoused by this body is stifled.
The Moscow Trials are often cited by scholars and historians of the New York 
Intellectuals as a turning point in the group’s relationship to Stalinism, and Sidney 
Hook was no exception. Neil Jumonville writes of the NYI: “After the wrenching 
Moscow Trials of 1936, their bitter hatred for the centralization, deceit, murder, anti-
intellectualism, and undemocratic nature of Stalinism led them to become anti-Stalin-
ist socialists.”58 Alexander Bloom observes that after the Moscow Trials, the NYI’s 
“prevailing anti-Stalinist ethos had not yet turned anti-Communist. Stalinism, not 
communism, emerged as the enemy.”59 While not yet as critical of Communism in the 
mid-1930s as he would be in later years, the trials nevertheless had a profound effect 
on Hook and set the stage for his later anti-Communism. Hook discusses the Mos-
cow Trials and their impact in Out of Step, calling them “a decisive turning point in 
[his] intellectual and political development,”60 when he “discovered the face of radical 
evil—as ugly and petrifying as anything the Fascists had revealed up to that time.”61
Aside from the general disillusionment of the NYI with Stalinism after 
the Moscow Trials and the Hitler-Stalin Pact,62 Hook’s experience with the Wal-
dorf Conference also led him to believe that Communists were not interested in 
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intellectual freedom or knowledge generated from open and communal inquiry, 
two qualities Hook saw as essential to democratic progress. Neil Jumonville writes 
that of the NYI, Hook was the most adamant “about the Waldorf Conference’s 
betrayal of intellectual values, and his passion on this point was a hallmark of his 
life and ideals.”63 Hook had requested that he be allowed to speak at the Waldorf 
Conference (formally known as the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World 
Peace but called the Waldorf Conference because of its location). Hook was con-
cerned about the conference because it was promoted as an event for intellectuals 
to discuss current affairs; however, Communists dominated among the speakers. 
Hook wrote to Harlow Shapley, one of the conference organizers, requesting to 
read a paper at the conference, but he was denied, which Hook interpreted as intellec-
tual dishonesty. According to Jumonville, “Hook told Shapley he would argue that there 
were no national, class, or party ‘truths’ in science, and that international peace and 
science had been ‘seriously undermined’ by those doctrines.”64 Like Peirce and James 
before him, Hook firmly believed that we gain knowledge and insight based upon our 
observation and analysis of facts, and not based upon our preconceived notions or 
feelings about the facts. Like Dewey before him, Hook was determined to reject “party 
discipline in favor of freedom of thought.”65 In other words, Hook saw Communism 
as distorting and obfuscating scientific truth and progress for the sake of pushing its 
own agenda, and to Hook, this was fundamentally antidemocratic. In “Naturalism and 
Democracy,” Hook writes, “scientific empiricism as a philosophy is more congenial to 
a democratic than to an antidemocratic community, for it brings into the open light 
of criticism the interests in which moral values and social institutions are rooted.”66 
Considering what had become of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union, 
the Moscow Trials, and his experience with the Waldorf Conference, Hook was con-
vinced that Communists had no interest in scientific progress or the pursuit of real 
knowledge, for they had made clear their stance that the Party trumped free and open 
communication and exchange of ideas. In so doing, Communism had revealed itself 
to be directly in conflict with democratic progress. Hook explains in Pragmatism and 
the Tragic Sense of Life that “the only reliable evidence”67 of a person’s change of heart 
on a subject is “the change in his habits, his deeds, his personal and public behavior.”68 
Ultimately, the Waldorf Conference cemented for Hook that Communist Party mem-
bers would have no change of heart with respect to putting free and open discussion 
above their concern for advancing the Party. Robert Talisse has argued that Hook 
“sees free consent and free discussion as epistemic matters”69 integral to democracy 
and that “in particular, citizens must be able to inquire.”70 For Hook, Communists 
cared more about their political agenda than about scientific or communal inquiry, 
and thus, the Communist Party was a threat to the democratic method.
Hook’s application of democracy as a method has a direct parallel to the 
empirical method in the classical pragmatist writings of Peirce and James. In “The 
Fixation of Belief,” Peirce describes four methods of belief and explains why, of 
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the four, the method of science is the most logical choice. The first method is the 
method of tenacity. This is the “ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand” method of belief, 
where one dislikes being undecided and as a result feels that holding on to a belief 
that does not waver will provide satisfaction and calmness. Second, the method of 
authority is the method of some governing body that concerns itself with regulat-
ing people’s opinions on certain matters and preventing or quashing any opinions 
that contradict the views this governing body has adopted. The third method, the 
a priori method, allows us to adopt any propositions that we find ourselves inclined 
to believe. But Peirce’s preferred method is the method of science, which he explains 
as follows: “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our 
opinions about them; [. . .] by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can 
ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient 
experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion.”71 
Therefore, by communal inquiry through application of this method, we will get 
closer to the truth and increase our collective knowledge about the world. Peirce 
argues that no doubts about the scientific method arise from its practice, as is the 
case with each of the other three methods of belief, for the method of science is 
the only method that presents a distinction between a right and wrong way of 
carrying it out. On this point he writes, “The test of whether I am truly following 
the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the 
contrary, itself involves the application of the method.”72 This means that a person 
following the scientific method will reach a conclusion through direct experience 
and observation of the facts, and not through his or her feelings about the facts.
Peirce believed that the scientific method proved itself to be the best method 
of increasing our knowledge and coming closer to the truth because our conclusions 
are revisable, which enables science to withstand the test of time. While it is true that 
we may reach faulty conclusions, these will eventually be corrected. Sidney Hook 
held a similar view of democracy. If democracy is a method, then “the self-corrective 
procedures of democracy”73 will result in greater knowledge and a greater number 
of people who are able to contribute to society over time. As with science, the test 
of whether the method of democracy is being followed involves applying it: ensur-
ing individual rights and the ability to participate freely in the democratic process.
Like Peirce, William James argues in Pragmatism that the pragmatist “turns 
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori 
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and ori-
gins.”74 This stands in contrast to what James calls “the empiricist temper,”75 which 
is concerned with facts, action, and experience. Similar to what Peirce says about 
the method of science, James believes empiricism to be a superior method of think-
ing because it is based on our observation of facts and incorporating those facts 
into the stream of our experience. The empiricist decides the validity of conflicting 
ideas by “tracing [their] respective practical consequences.”76 In Hook’s conception 
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of democracy as a method, those who follow it must likewise examine the practi-
cal consequences of adopting one policy over another, lest those decisions serve to 
reduce democracy rather than increase it.
Hook’s experiences with the Communist Party convinced him that advanc-
ing a predetermined set of objectives was more important to them than allowing 
for intellectual differences and rational debate countenanced by the democratic 
method of government. Robert Talisse observes that while it is possible to judge 
“with the hindsight of fifty years that Hook overestimated the threat that the CP 
[Communist Party] posed,”77 in considering Hook’s philosophical and political 
positions regarding Communism, the question is “about what Hook was justified 
in believing, not about what we should now believe—again with all the clarity of 
hindsight—about the severity of the threat.”78 Similarly, Richard Rorty argues that 
those who did not live through World War II “may find it hard to appreciate how 
necessary [Hook’s] crusade [against Stalinism] was,”79 particularly since it was dif-
ficult for many on the political Left in the US “to admit the existence of the gulag.”80 
Indeed, Hook writes toward the end of Out of Step that the arc of his thought had 
shifted over time, stating, “I no longer believe that the central problem of our time 
is the choice between capitalism and socialism but the defense and enrichment 
of a free and open society against totalitarianism.”81 Thus, while it is easy to con-
clude from the safe distance of a post-Cold War world that Hook’s staunch anti- 
Communism was unnecessary, Hook and many others genuinely believed that 
totalitarian Communism posed a real and significant threat to American democ-
racy based on their experiences with Communists and the CP. 
Robert Talisse points out that, throughout his life, Hook never displayed 
“a refusal to argue, a reluctance to listen to an opposing view, or an unwillingness to 
reconsider his own position in the light of opposing considerations.”82 Given Hook’s 
adherence to the primacy of open inquiry and discussion as well as to both the scientific 
and the democratic method throughout his lifetime, I must conclude with Talisse, and 
contra many Cold War and NYI scholars and historians, that Hook did not betray or 
abandon pragmatism in his hardline stance against Communism. Rather, he demon-
strated a sustained commitment to the scientific and democratic methods, which was 
in line with the philosophy of earlier pragmatists, including Peirce, James, and Dewey. 
In an essay on the common philosophy that democracies share, Hook argues, 
“We cannot make absolutes of doctrines, tastes, or principles without inviting the evils 
of fanaticism. Nonetheless, there must be one working absolute on which there can be 
no compromise, about which we must be fanatical: the rules of the game, by which we 
settle differences.”83 For Hook, the “rules of the game” meant democracy, which explains 
why he so fanatically defended it from any perceived threats. As Peirce and James were 
committed to the method of empiricism, so was Hook committed to the democratic 
method. He adds, “There is no inconsistency whatsoever in being intolerant of those who 
show intolerance.”84 To Hook, Communists had shown themselves to be intolerant of 
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open discussion and intellectual inquiry, and thus, their goals were not compatible with 
the goals of those who wished, like Hook, to preserve and extend democratic freedoms. 
During the Cold War, Communism loomed large in the national consciousness as a 
potential threat to democracy, and Hook was determined not to let intellectuals who were 
affiliated with the Communist Party subvert free inquiry for the sake of a politics where 
intellectual progress and scientific contributions were not valued or given consideration. 
Hook’s work, like that of his mentor John Dewey, points to democracy as an 
action that must be realized, open to continued growth and change rather than 
mired in old ways of thinking about ideas or serving the needs of one group or 
ideology at the expense of others. Hook’s anti-Communism was ultimately con-
cerned with preserving the democratic ideals of freedom and open inquiry that we 
often take for granted. For this reason, pragmatism likewise played a significant 
role before and during the Cold War as the source of Hook’s fervent commitment 
to democracy. In an increasingly politically polarized society, Hook’s legacy of 
democracy as method seems more important than ever if Americans are to come 
together in support of the democratic method rather than remaining divided by 
our devotion to the goals or doctrines of a single figure or political party.
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